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Chris Brooks"'

Wlbm {the] ethic ofacquisition combinrs witb a strong disposition to regmd
liberty as the dominant politiml value ... you have crMted a society in which
people believe it is their right to get what they can and to kup what they get.'

n the 1980s movie Wall Street, the character Gordon Gecko, corporate
raider, made a statement that embodied the prevailing corporate and economic thought of the day. " Ladies and gentlemen," he stared, "greed, for
lack of a better word, is good." Even up until the corporate scandals of the
past few years broke, "greed is good" was still the existing sentiment among
economists who espoused Adam Smith's Invisible Hand as the miracle of the
free marketplace. It seemed that greed was indeed good, and people trusted
in the Invisible Hand to watch over the markets in combination with existing regulations and laws. However, almost overnight, the glitter of "greed is
good" was discovered to be nothing more than fool's gold, as scandal after
scandal rocked corporate America. It was not so much the occurrence of the
scandals- corporate crime has been a part of economics throughout histori -but their scale that was so shocking.

I

• Chris Brooks, from 11tousand Oaks, CA. graduated in 2003 wit:h a BS degree in
mputer engineering and works as an embedded software engineer. He is inreresred
in pursuing a career in intellectual prope r~:)' aiiCI copyiight law.
' Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corpomtr Respomibiliry (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2001), 36. His argument that today's market is more concerned abour shore-term stock
price jumps than long-term growth is a pivotal focus point of t:his article.
' Susan Harrigan, "When 'Greed Is Good' Goes Wrong," Newsday. Available from
http: //www. newsday.com/busi ness/printed ition/ n y-bzgreedO 2 277009 5j u10 2.storv?
coll=ny-business-prinr; (accessed March 25, 2003). Some interesting business scandals
duoughout hiswry since 1700:
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Billions of dollars were lose in the Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing,
and other major corporate scandals where it was discovered chat senior managers and directors had been fraudulently concealing debts, using "creative
accounting" to doctor financial statements and then quietly skimming off
what was left for themselves. Greed had become bad. Even as Congress
rushed to implement reforms, economists, lawyers, and pundits everywhere
were asking how it could be that such a commonly held economic belief
could be wrong.
This article seeks to examine that issue as well as some possible solutions
to it, exploring rwenry years of economic thought, studies, and legal articles.
First, I will explore the current economic theory and its weakness. This exploration will begin from the assumptions of rationaliry that have been made
for the accepted economic models of individuals and corporations. I will
chen show how those assumptions are no longer valid in our current corporate atmosphere. Second, this article will focus on the apparently irrational
decisions that lead ro corporate scandals. I will show char it is nor char rhe
corporations and managers involved made irrational decisions, bur rather
char rhe decisions rhey made were based on a rarionaliry which has more influencing factors chan the currenr theory allowed for. This section will focus
especially on the notions of profit maximization and stock price maximization, as well as how stock prices have become such a dominating factor in
corporate decision making that they have completely destroyed rhe model
1720: The fim great stock market crash occurred in England when the "Sourh Sea
Bubble" in stock of a company monopolizing uade in the South Seas collapsed amid
allegations of bribery and stock manipulation.
1920: Charles Ponzi promised investors a 50 perccnr profit in 4 5 days for purchasing notes. Early buyers were paid from cash collected from later buyers, but Ponzi rook
Lhe rest of the proceeds. When late buyers saw through the scheme, it collapsed.
1930: lvar Krueger, called the "March King" because he headed companies that
made most of the world's marches, used all sorts of shenanigans to deceive shareholders,
including sccrc::rly borrowing money at high imerest rates in order ro pay dividends.
1938: Richard Whitney, the ex-presidenr of the New York Srock Exchange. was
found to have raken money from a fund for widows and orphans and the New York Yachr
Club, among orhcr places, co prop up his own liquor business.
1962: Billie Sol Estes, a Texas wheeler-dealer wirh high political connecrions, raised
money by mortgaging fium gear that didn't exisr.
1986: Wall Street arbirrageur h'an Boesky was nabbed for insider trading. His testimony led to the conviction of junk bond king Michael Milkcn for marker manipulation.
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that most laws and assumptions about corporate behavior are based on.
Third, I will examine the issues involved in fixing rhe current corporate culrure and prevention of corporate crimes in rhe future. This will show that
many of the current suggestions and proposals to prevent corporate crime
have merit bur are too narrow ro have any lasting effect by themselves. 3 I will
then conclude this area of analysis by presenring a solution combined from
the other, narrower proposals. The idea will be co use the strengths of the
various strategies while eliminating their weaknesses.

l. N EW WINE

A.

IN OLD jARS

WHY THE CURRENT THEORY M UST B E REVISED

Current economic theory (upon which most corporate law is based) relies, among ocher things, on the premise that most of us act rationally. The
assumption is that people are uriliry-maxim izing decision makers. In other
words, when faced with decisions, an individual will perform a utiliry calculation and come up with a plan of action chat will maximize his or her
expected utili()', or happiness. This calculatjon, according to economists,
consists of measuring the cosrs and benefits of an action: This calculation
then leads a rational agent ro pursue rhe best end for himsel(
As humans, we have anempred ro anthropomorphize the corporation
and its decision-making process co fir our rationaliry model.' However, corporations present a certain diffi.culry fo r chis model. Corporations are large
organizarions of diverse people with rhe goal of maximizing profits. In this
' The analvsis rhat will follow is lw no means imended to disparage any economic
theories or proposals for corporare refo;m. My focus and hypothesis is that each of these
has merir but must be combined toget her ro achieve any eiTecrive and lasting reform.
• Mark A. Cohen and ~ally S. Simpson, "The Origins of Corporate Criminality,"
Debating Corporate Crime (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company, 1997). For individuals, this rarional calculus is explaiucd besr by Cohrn and Simpson as a calculation that
attempts to maximize an individual's expected urility by raking into account rhe results of
a decision on one's income, qualiry of life. reputation, and self-respect.
' If we take the corporation to be a rational en tiry, Cohen and Simpson provide another calculation for the corporation where rhc goal is ro maximize profit, nor utility. The
calculus in this case takes into accounr the results of a decision on rhc corporation's price
of product x total sales, net benefit from illegal acriviry, cost of production/distribution,
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most laws and assumptions about corporate behavior are based on.
Third, I will examine the issues involved in fixing the current corporate cuicure and prevention of corporate crimes in the future. T his will show that
many of the current suggestions and proposals to prevent corporate crime
have merit but are too narrow to have any lasting effect by themselves. 3 I will
chen conclude this area of analysis by presenting a solution combined fro m
che other, narrower proposals. The idea will be to use the strengths of the
various strategies while eliminating their weaknesses.

l.
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N EW WINE IN

OLD j ARS

WHY THE CURRENT THEORY M UST B E REVISED

Current economic theory (upon which m ost corporate law is based) relie among ocher things, on the premise that most of us act rationally. The
assumption is that people are uriliry-maximizing decision makers. In other
words, when faced with decisions, an individual will perform a utiliry calculation and come up with a plan of action that will maximize his or her
expected utiliry, or happiness. T his calculation, according to economists,
consists of measuring the costs and benefits of an action.' This calculation
then leads a rational agent ro pursue the best end for himsel(
As humans, we have attempted ro anthropomorphize the corporation
and irs decision-making process to fir our rationaliry model. 5 However, corporations present a certain diffi.culry for this model. Corporations are large
organizations of diverse people with the goal of maximizing profits. In this
' TI1e analvsis that will follow is hy no means intended tO disparage any economic
d1eories or proposals for corporate reform. My focus and hypothesis is that each of these
has merit but must be combined together ro achieve any eiTecrive and lasting reform.
• Mark A. Cohen and ~ally S. Simpscm, "The Origins of Corporate Criminality,''
Debming Corporate Crime (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company, 1997). For individuals, this rational calculus is explaiucd besr by Cohrn and Simpson as a calculation thar
attempts to maximize an individual's expected utility by raking inro account the results of
a decision on one's income, quality of life. reputation, and self~ respecr.
' If we rake rhe corporation to be a rarional en riry, Cohen and Simpson provide another calculation for the corporation where the goal is ro maxi111ize profit, not utility. The
calculus in d1is case rakes into accounr the results of a decision on rhc corporation's price
of product x total sales, net benefit from illegal activiry, cost nf producrion/disrribution,
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context, then, their utility maximization function would attempt to make
the greatest amount of profit for the company. This has been the accepted
model in the legal world. There is no shortage of court cases in which the
corporation has been considered a profit-maximizing rational juris entity,
and this idea has been the basis for the decisions in several cases about corporate liability.6
Courts generally hold that by the rationality definition, corporations
will not com mit crimes since the sanctions involved would be so great as to
make it irrational to do so. Indeed, this is the basis behind laws and regulations that attempt ro make the cost of the crime roo high to be rational. Yet
even with regulations in place to make corporate crime irrational: it is still
committed.
and sancrion for illegal acriviry. However, this creares a problem, as rhey explain on page
38 of rheir article: "The model of corporate decision-making we presented is general
enough to allow for rhe case where rhe firm ignores any social responsibiliry of business
unless rhe firm fmds rhar its interest (i.e., long run profirabiliry) is best served by being socially responsible, as well as the case where social responsibiliry is assumed robe one of rhe
consrrainrs on prollr maximizarion itsel£" In orher words, whereas individuals will consider rhe social and moral ramificarions of their acrions and factor rhar inro rheir calculadon, corporations only look ar social responsibiliries in a bortom-line, amoral manner.
6
Roberr A. Prenrice, "The Case of the lrrarional Audiror: A Behavioral Insight inro
Securities Fraud Lirigarion," Northwestem University Law Review 95, no. l (2000): 133.
Prenrice quo res from several corporare and accounring fraud cases in which ir was assumed
by rhe courrs (and so reflecred in their decisions) char many of rhe acrions the defendanrs
were accused of were irrational, given rheir si ruarion. The opinion from Melder v. Morris
(27 E3d 1097 5th Cir. 1994) holds rhac "accounring firms-as with all rational economic
accors-seek to maximize rheir profits.... [Therefore,] it seems exrremely w1likely char
[defendant audit firm] was willing co pur irs professional reputation on the line by conducting fraudulenr auditing work for [irs diem]." Anorher famous case is quored on page
136-rbar of DiLeo v. Ernst & Young (901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990]), in which rhe judge
wrote, "The complaint does not allege that frhe audir firm) had anything ro gain from any
fraud by [irs diem] .... Ir would have been irrarional for any of rhem to have joined cause
with [rhe clienc]." However, as he larer nores, audiring companies and ocher corporarions
do indeed commit rhese crimes that would seem co be irrational according ro common
economic rheory.
7
Prentice explains, on page 138 of his article, rhe consequences of courts looking at
rarional and irrational behavior when dealing wirh corporate crime. "DiLeo embodies rwo
of rhe most significanr dangers of law and economics theorizing. First, law and economics analysis is sometimes predicated on flawed core assumptions. In this case, the core assumprions are char (a) audirors are always rarional actors, and (b) audit fums are always
rarional acrors. Second, ro be operarionalized to rhe real world. rhe core asswnptions of
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The reason for this is that rhe model of a corporation as a rational en. makes assumptions about rationality and ignores differences between the
uty
· · 1
corporation and the individual. The most dangerous ~ssm~pt.JOn tS ~ 1at an
individual (or corporation) always acts with perfect rattonality m makmg decisions. Due to human limitations, our rational choices are made with an
imperfect, limited form of rationalio/ that m~y appear to.pr~duce irrational
choices. For example, motorists know there rs a speed lunrt on roads and
consequences for exceeding it. However, many choose tO break the lawacting in a seemingly irrational manner.
.
.
A major difference between the individual and the corporauon m rational decision making is that an individual has a moral function which factors into his decisions. This often allows an individual ro choose an action
rhat may not maximize his utility but will instead provide some benefit to
society as a whole. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics gives an excellent argument
for the uses of morality in the individual's decisions as they relate to society.9
law and economics must rypically be supplememed wirh addirional (occasionally unrealistic) assumptions abour how rhe real world works ... that (c) ir is always irradonal
for individual auditors ro aud it fraudulently or recklessly, and (d) it is always irrational for audit firms to audit fraudulently or recklessly."
Donald C. Langevoort, "Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Srock Marker lnvesror~ ( and Cause Other Social ~~~·ms),"
University of Pmmylvania Law Review 146 ( 1997): 106. Langevoorr nores that from a
rational srandpoinr, why would public companies ever deliberately lie £O in~esrors .whcr~,
because they are neither buying nor selling stock in the open marker, there rs nod~:ng dJrecdy ro gain? ... Yet cases of alleged deception seem m persisr ~n large numbers ..
a Some of rhe limitations on rarionaliry are gi\•en by Prentrce ( 133). Those rnclude
batmded rationality (an agent can'r process information perfectly and does nor have perfect information), rarional ignorance (the tradeoflberween cognitive effort and judgmental accuracy- making merely sarisfacrory, rarher rhan optimal deci~ions), pcrceprio~
limitations (agems don't perceive data in a perfect way), memory limitations, undue o~u
rnism and overconfidence (which occurs quire frequently in corporate culrure). frammg
(e.g., how a srarement is worded--either positively or negacivcly), the inabiliry co estimate
probabilities, behavioral traps (sunk costs, rime-delay traps), and bounded willpower.
• Arisrode's argument was that a good sociery needs virtuous (ethical) agenrs. His
solution was rhar people need laws to bring rhem up and show rhem virtue when young
so rhar they will choose vin ue as adults. His belief was char virrue is somerhing char we
learn, nor something char we are necessarily born with. As a result, in order ro make correct and virtuous decisions in sociery, we need to have been trained up in the ways of
virtue so char rhey end up in our calculus for rariQnal action.
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and sancrion for illegal activity. However, rhis crearcs a problem, as rhey explain on page
38 of their arride: "'The model of corporate decision-making we presented is general
enough to allow for rhe case where rhe firm ignores any social responsibility of business
unless the firm fmds that its interest (i.e., long run profitabilicy) is best served by being socially responsible, as well as the case where social responsibilicy is assumed to be one of the
constraints on profit maximitation itself" In other words, whereas individuals will consider the social and moral ramifications of their actions and factor that into their calculation, corporations only look at social responsibilities in a bottom-line, amoral manner.
6
Roberr A. Premice, "The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation," Northwestern Universif:J' Law Review 95, no. I (2000): 133.
Prentice quotes from several corporate and accouming fraud cases in which it was assumed
by the courts (and so reflected in their decisions) rhat many of rhe actions the defendanrs
were accused of were irrational, given their situation. The opinion from Melder v. Morris
(27 F. 3d I 097 5th Cir. 1994) holds that "accounting firms-as with all rational economic
actors-seek to ma>.imizc their profits.... [Therefore,] it seems extremely unlikely rhar
[defcndanc audit firm] was willing to pur irs professional reputation on the line by conducting fraudulent auditing work for (irs client]." Another famous case is quoted on page
136-that of DiLeo v. Ernst & You11g (901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990]), in which the judge
wrote, "The complaint does nor allege that [the audit firm] had anything to gain from any
fraud by [irs diem] .... h would have been irrational for any of them ro have joined cause
with [the client]." However, as he later notes, auditing companies and od1er corporations
do indeed conunit these crimes that would seem to he irrational according to common
economic theory.
' Prentice explains, on page 138 of his arricle, the consequences of courts looking at
rarional and irrational behavior when dealing with corporate crime. "DiLeo embodies rwo
of the most significant dangers of law and economics theorizing. First, law and economics analysis is sometimes predicated on flawed core assumptions. In this case, the core assumptions are rhar (a) auditors are always rational actors, and (b) audit firms are alv.•.tys
rational acrors. Second, tO be operationalized 10 the real world, the core: assumptions of
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9
for rhe uses of moraliry in the individual's decisions as they relate to society.
law and economics must rypically be supplememed with additional (occasionally unrealistic) assumptions about how the real world works ... that (c) it is always irrational
for individual auditors to audit fraudulently or recklessly, and (d) ir is always irrational for audir firms to audit fraudulently or recklessly."
Donald C. l.angcvoort, ~Organized lllusiom: A Behavioral 1"he~ry of Wh;,
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probabilities, behavioral craps (sunk costs, time-delay uaps), and bounded willpower.
• Aristotle's argument was rhat a good society needs virmous (ethical) agents. His
solution was that people need laws to bring them up and show them virtue when young
so rhar thev will choose virtue as adults. His belief was that virme is something that we
learn, not ~omething rhat we are necessaril)' born wirh. As a result, in order to make corr~ct and virmous decisions in socierv, we need to have been trained up in rhe wavs of
virme so that they end up in our calculus for rational action.
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However, the corporation, although it is made up of individuals, has no
moral compass nor social responsibilities to factor into irs profit-maximizing
function. Irs only purpose is to make money. 10
This is only part of the weakness inherent in the "corporation as a rational enrity" model. Another weakness is that it ignores the schiwphrenia
of the corporation. While it is indeed a profit-maximizing entity, the corporation is made up of people who have different goals. The model begins to
break down when we consider all of the different actors involved in the corporation's decisions, as well as the effect that the corporate culture has on
them. Clearly, the corporation cannot be considered a decision-making entity in itself, since irs board of directors and managers make decisions, nor
the corporation. On the other hand, the managers and directors have to pur
aside their own goals to work cowards the goals of the firm.' ' This creates a
schizophrenia that makes our rational model very difficult to use when considering corporate crime.

B. TOWARDS A MORE WORKABLE MODEL
A theory as problematic as the rational entity model is not very accurate
when we attempt to determine the true nature of why corporate crime occurs and what we can do to prevent it. Legal and economic experts advocate
different models to use when exan1ining these issues. We will choose a model

'" MitcheU (46-47) stares that "when we tail we have souls to damn and bodies ro
kick. We have the capacity and usually the desire to repent for, and sometimes rectify, our
misrakes. Corporations have no such mechanism. Quire rhe opposite ... rhe corporation
knows one thi ng and rhar is profit maximization, regardless of the fact that ir requires
human beings to help it pursue that goal. 11te result is that corporations are able to act
without morality or accowuabiliry for they are formed for a single purpose."
11
Edward Thurlow, First Baron, is repured ro have said (about 250 years ago), "Did
you ever expccl a corporation to have a conscience, when ir has no soul robe damned, ancl
no body to be kicked?" (qtd. in John Coffee, "No Soul to Damn, No Body ro Kick,"
Michigan Law Review 79 [1981): 386). The corporation's amoral nature and the manager's
moral nature- however weak ir may be-clash rogether when making decisions. Mitchell
(72) maintains that "corporate moral development, whidt means the free moral develop·
menr of corporate actors as corporate actors, is a precondition to responsible, accountable
corpora1e behavior." Corporations, by being builr on an amoral foundation, ofren do not
allow free moral development and decisions by their agents.
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that considers the managers and directors to be the decision makers. The
two major camps espousing this model are the agency model and the structure modelY Each of these can1ps has strengths and weaknesses, based on
rheir specific assumptions and methods. 11
For the rest of this article, I propose a model which I call the "expanded
agency" model. This is the model hinted at by Mark A. Cohen and Sally S.
Simpson. Ir seems that the best solution lies between the two theories. As
" Cohen and Simpson (33) explain the agency model's basic premise "that corporate
crime occurs as a result of choices made by managets or other individuals within an organization." This model looks ar rhe individuals involved in decision making and factors
in rhe corporation's influence only as a minor facwr.
David Ennann and Gary A. Rabe, "Organizational Processes (Not Rational C hoices)
Produce Most Corporate Crimes,'' Debmi11g Corporate Crime (Cincinnati: Anderson
Publishing Company, 1997), 59. Ermann and Rabe explain the strucrural model.
"Opposing agency models arc 'organizational process' or structure models which argue
char organizational crimes flow from orgaui7ational contexts rather than conscious motives. . . . The structural model permits rationality, bur it starts from different observations about how corporations cope wi1·h the worlds in which they operate. They arrempt,
somerimes successfully, to balance incompatible goals.... Crime may be rhe product of
a set of non-criminJI decisions, which ultimarelr give~ later decision-makers the motives
and opportunities ro commit crimes." This model looks ar the corporate culture as causing the situations rhat force corporate agents to make certain decisions. In brief. the
agency model assumes that rhe crimes are committed by the individuals working for
the organization-the indh,idual acts rationally to pursue the corporation's goals. The
srrucrure model, on the other hand, maintains that t he corporate culture itself creates situations in which rhe outcome of a decision is based solely on thar culture-in other
words, the philosophy that the devil (the corporation) made me do it.
u Ermann and Rabe, 57. "Morives compete. There are many levels of rationality."
Neither model (agency or structural) is completely correct for this reason, as well as the
reasoning given by Cohen and Simpson (Cohen 34). They note that "unlike traditional
street crime or white-collar crime, there is often an additional layer of control and decisiou making rhat affects rhe decision to commit [corpora1e] crime. That layer of comrol
is the corporation irself, which may provide incentives or disincentives to commit (or prevent) crimi nal acriviry within rhe corporation." Thus we see that the two models are examining different facets of the corporate criminal's motivation, but neither explores the
whole issue. Instead, we must focus our inquiry on a combination of rhe two theories
which will rake inro account borh the individual's raaional calculus as well as the effect rhar
the corporate structure has on the individual's decision. Ermann and Rabe (67) agree with
this idea in their sraremcm: "Organizational crime is multicausal .... Each decision and
non-decision musr be understood in light of what has happened up to that poinr in rhe
company, nor in terms of rhe presumed guiding star of profit maximization."
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H owever, the corporation, although ir is made up of individuals, has no
moral compass nor social responsibilities to factor inro irs profit-maximizing
function. Irs only purpose is ro make money. 10
This is only parr of the weakness inherent in the "corporation as a rational emir/' model. Another weakness is that it ignores the schizophrenia
of rhe corporation. While it is indeed a profit-maximizing entity, the corporation is made up of people who have different goals. The model begins to
break down when we consider all of the different actors involved in the corporation's decisions, as well as the effect that rhe corporate culture has on
them. Clearly, the corporation cannot be considered a decision-making entity in itself, since irs board of directors and managers make decisions, nor
the corporation. On the other hand, the managers and directors have to put
aside their own goals to work towards the goals of the firm. 11 This creates a
schizophrenia that mal<es our rational model very difficult to use when considering corporate crime.

8. TOWARDS A MORE WORKABLE MODEL
A theory as problematic as the rational entity model is nor very accurate
when we attempt to determine the true narure of why corporate cri me occurs and what we can do ro prevent it. Legal and economic experts advocate
different models to use when examining these issues. We will choose a model

1

Mitchell (46-47) stares that "when we fail we have souls ro damn and bodies ro
kick. We have rhc capacity and usually the desire ro repem for, and sometimes rectify, our
mistakes. Corporations have no such mechanism. Quire the opposire . .. rhe corporation
knows one rhing and rll31 is profit maximization, regardless of rhe fucr rhar ir requires
human beings ro help ir pursue rhar goal. T he result is rhar corporations are able ro acr
wirhour morality or accowuabiliry for rhey are formed for a single purpose.~
11
Edward Thurlow, Firsr Baron, is reputed ro have said (about 250 years ago), "Did
you ever cxpecc a corporation ro have a conscience, when ir has no soul to be damned, and
no body ro be kicked?" (qrd. in John Coffee, "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick,"
Mirhignn Law Retdew 79 [1981]: 386). The corporation's amoral nature and rh e manager's
moral nature--however weak ir may be-clash together when making decisions. Mitchell
(72) mai mains that "corporate moral development, which means the free moral develop·
menr of corporate acrors as corporate actors, is a prccondirion to responsible, accountable
corporare behavior." Corporarions, by being built on an amoral fou ndation, often do nor
allow free moral development and decisions by rheir agents.
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that considers the managers and directors to be the decision makers. The
rwo major camps espousing rhis model are the agency model and rhe srrucrure model. u Each of these can1ps has strengths and weaknesses, based on
rheir specific assumptions and merhodsY
For the rest of this article, I propose a model which I call the "expanded
ency" model. This is the model hinted at by Mark A Cohen and Sally S.
Simpson. It seems that the best solution lies between the two theories. As
: Cohen and Simpson (33) explain rhe agency model's basic premise "that corporate
crime occurs as a result of choices made by managers or orher individuals within an organizarion." T his model looks ar rhe indi viduals involved in decision making and factors
in the corporation's influence only as a minor facwr.
David Ermann and Gary A. Rabc, "Organizational Processes (Nor Rational Choices)
Produce Most Corporate Crimes,'' Debnri11g Corporate Crime (Cincinnati: Anderson
Publishing Company, 1997), 59. Ermann and Rabe explain the structural model.
"Opposing agency models are 'organiz.1rional procc~s' or srrucrure models which argue
thar organizational crimes flow from organizati onal co nrexrs rather than conscious motives. . . . The suucrural mod el permits rationality. bur it starrs from different obse rvations abour how corporations cope with rhe worlds in which they operate. They attempt,
sometimes successfully, to balance incompatible goals.. .. Crime may be rhe product of
a ser of non-crimitul decisions, which ullimardy gives later decision-makers the motives
and opponuniries to commit crimes." TI1is model looks at the corporate culture as causing rhe simarions rhar force corporate agents to make cerrai n decisions. In brief, the
agency model assumes that the crimes are committed by the individuals working for
rhe organization-the individual acrs rationally ro pnrsue the corporation's goals. ·n,e
Structure model, on the orher hand, maintains that t he corporate culrure itself creares si ruations in which the outcome of a deci~ion is b.tSed solely on rhat culture--in orher
words, the philosophy rhat the devil (rhe corporation) made me do ir.
u Ermann and Rabe, 57. "Morives compere. There are many levels of rationality."
Neither model (agency or srructural) is completely correct for this reason, as well as rhe
reasoning given by Cohen and Simpson (Cohen 34). T hey nore thar "unlike traditional
street crime or white-collar crime, there is ofren an additional layer of control and decision making rhar affects rhc decision ro commit [co rporate] crime. That layer of control
is the corporation irsdf, which may provide incenrivcs or disincentives to commit (or prevent) crimi nal activiry wirhin rhe corporati on." Thus we see rhat rhe rwo models are examini ng different facers of the cn rporarc criminal 's motivation, but neither explores rhe
whole issue. lnsread, we musr focus our inquiry OJl a combination of rhe rwo theories
which will rake into account both rhc individual's rational calculus as well as rhe effect rhat
the co rporate sr rucrure has on rhe individu;tl's decision. Ermann and Rabe (67) agree wirh
this idea in rheir sratcmenr: "Organi1.1tional crime is multicausal .... Each decision and
non-decision musr be understood in li gh t of what has happened up to that point in the
company, nor in terms of rhe presumed guiding srar of profit maximization."
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Cohen points out, we are obliged to recognize that corporate crime is committed by rationally acting individuals. Even if those individuals are acting
on behalf of rhe corporation, the corporation itself is not the rational actor.
As examined by Simpson, we must also note chat the environment and culture of corporations is different for each corporation, and rhus these factors
can and should be accounted for in our determination of the rational calculus of a manager or director of such a corporation.
What this model does for us is to allow us co collapse the apparent
schizophrenic decisions of corporations into an understandable process that
is built o n many years of human philosophical observation. We are no lo nger
limited co looking ar a soulless monster (a.k.a. The Corporation), but instead at rhe parts of the corporation that acrually make the daily decisions
which are either legal or illegal- decisions based on the individual's rational
calculus which is influenced by the environment in which he is making chose
decisions. We are also not limited to simply looking aL the corporate culture
as the sole cause of those decisions. Wich this model we are prepared co proceed to exa mine how the current corporate situation causes rational
decisions that break the law.

II. GREED

GONE VERY

BAD

A. THE GOALS OF A C ORPORATION

The stared goal of a corporation is to make as much money as possible.
In days gone by, businesses would be owned and managed by one person, or
a very few pe<>ple, who would expand the business as much as possible while
building a company that had the potential for long-term success. In the
event that the company went public with stock, the company's goal then
evolved to maximizing the profit of the new owners-the shareholders-by
making the srock worth as much as possible.
Somewhere along the line, though, profit maximization began to mean
stock price maximization. This in turn, led managers to focus more on
the srock price as the measure of success of the corporation•• as opposed to

" Here Mitchell (3) argues rhar "the main problem with American corporations ...
is their drive to maximize shorr-term stock prices.... The root of the problem is the
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other long-term factors which had been the focus in the past. Addition~ly,
whereas stockholders used to invest in the company for the long run, hopmg
to get a return on their investment as the company grew ~ver _rime, presentday stockholders wish to make as much money as posstble tn as short an
ount of time as possible. Stockholders no longer care about the future of
: company,l 5 bur rather they care about how much the stock price enriches
their portfolio. As this trend has continued, rhose who invest in_ stoc~ h~ve
rurned from investors to gamblers, buying stocks that they thmk wtll nse
and then selling them if they fall a lirde or as soon as the stockholders have
made their desired profit.

B. SIDE E FFECTS MAY iNCLUDE ...
This shift in corporate goals has, in turn, led to an unintended side effect-managers and the board of directors in a corporation have become fixated on the concept of constandy rising stock prices. They have developed
this attitude for two reasons. The first is that the profit-maximization function has shifted from worrying about profits w worrying about stock prices.
This has led w an increased reliance o n a very unreliable value as a metric
for the success of the corporation. T he second is that with annual stockholders' meetings and elections, an executive's job is on the line if he does
nor cause the corporation's stock to rise consistently. These factors become
very strong factors in the corporate manager's rational decision-making
process. The modern corporate manager has to weigh being caught in illegal
activity co drive stock prices higher or being fired as a result of planning long
term while allowing the company's stock to depreciate slightly. For many this

corporate structure itself: che corporation's legal srrucrure encourages managers to aim for
exactlv chis shorr-rcrm result, ami it does so by constraining their freedom ro acr responsiblv. ." . . The resulr is immoral behavior.'' He further scares on page 5: "We no longer inve;t in corporarions, but in analysts' projections of future srock prices."
'5 Ibid., 144. T his is due co the uoncommitral atri!llde that shareholders develop tO·
wards investing. They think of themselves as gamblers more rhan rhey consider themselves
owners. Mitchell laments rhar "rhis is nor an arritude that produces caring stockholders.
It is cerrainlv not an anirude rhar would lead a stockholder ro read an annual report or
proxy sraren~enr, much less to fill out and return a proxy card and vote for direcrors."
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Cohen points out, we are obliged ro recognize that corporate crime is committed by rationally acting individuals. Even if chose individuals are acting
on behalf of the corporation, the corporation irself is nor the rational acror.
As examined by Simpson, we must also note that the environment and culture of corporations is different for each corporation, and rhus these factors
can and should be accounted for in our determination of rhe rational calculus of a manager or director of such a corporation.
What rhjs model does for us is to allow us ro collapse rhe apparent
schizophrenic decisions of corporations into an understandable process char
is built on m any years of human philosophical observation. We are no longer
limited co looking at a soulless monster (a.k.a. The Corporation), bur instead at the pares of the corporation that actually make the daily decisions
which are either legal or illegal- decisions based on rhe individual's rational
calculus which is influenced by the environment in which he is making those
decisions. We are also nor limited ro simply looking at che corporate culture
as the sole cause of chose decisions. Wich this model we are prepared to proceed to examine how the current corporate situation causes rational
decisions char break the law.

II.
A. THE

GREED GONE VERY

BAD

GOALS OF A CORPORATION

The scared goal of a corporation is to make as much money as possible.
In days gone by, businesses would be owned and managed by one person, or
a very few people, who would expand the business as much as possible while
building a company that had the potencial for long-term success. In rhe
event chat the company went public with stock, the company's goal chen
evolved co maximizing the profit of the new owners-the shareholders-by
making the stock worth as much as possible.
Somewhere along che line, though, profit maximization began co mean
stock price maximization. This in turn, led managers to focus mo re on
the stock price as che measure of success of the corporacion 14 as opposed co

,. Here Mitchell (3) argues that "the main problem wirh American corporations ...
is rheir drive to maximize shorr-rerm stock prices .... T he root of rhc problem is rhc
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cher Jong-rerm factors which had been rhe focus in the past. Addicion~ly,
whereas stockholders used to invest in the company for the long. nm, hopmg
get a return on their investment as the company grew over nme, presenttO
day
stockholders wish to make as much money as posst'ble .111 as sh ore an
oum of rime as possible. Stockholders no longer care about the future of
: company, 15 but rather they care about how much the stock price enriches
their portfolio. As this trend has continued, those who invest in. stoc~ h~ve
[\lined from investors to gamblers, buying stocks rhar they thmk wtll nse
and then selling them if they fall a little or as soon as the srockholders have
made their desired profit.

B. SIDE E FFECTS MAY iNCLUDE ...
T his shift in corporate goals has, in turn, led to an unintended side effect-managers and the board of directors in. a corporation have become fixated on rhe concept of coustantly rising stock prices. T hey have developed
chis attitude for two reasons. The first is char the profit-maximization function has shifted from worrying about profits to worrying about stock prices.
This has led co an increased reliance o n a very unreliable value as a metric
for the success of the corporation. T he second is that with annual stockholders' meetings and elections, an executive's job is on the line if he does
not cause the corporation's stock to rise consistently. These factors become
very strong factors in the corporate manager's rational decision-making
process. The modern corporate manager has to weigh being caught in illegal
activity to drive stock prices higher o r bei ng fired as a result of planning long
term whlle allowing the company's stock to depreciate slightly. For many thls

corporate srrucrure itself: the corporation's legal srrucrurc encourages managers ro aim for
exactly rhis shon-rerm result, and it docs so by consrraining their freedom ro act responsiblv. .' . . The result is immoral behavior." He further stares on page 5: "We no longer inve;r in corporations, bur in analysrs' projections of future srock prices."
' 5 Ibid., 144. This is due to the noncomminal anirude that shareholders develop to·
wards investing. 'TI1ey thi nk of themselves as gamblers more rhan they co~sider themselves
owners. Mirchell lamenrs that "rhis is nor an arrirude that produces canng stockholders.
lr is cerrainlv not an attitude char would lead a stockholder ro read an annual repon or
proxy sraten~enr, much less ro fill our and return a proxy card and vote for ditecrors.»
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proves to be no contest. 16 This is how scandals such as Enron have
come about.
Looking at the situation from more of an ethical standpoint also illuminates another side effect of stock price maximization. Because the fear of
being fired for low stock prices is so strong, managers tend to focus on that
aspect of management alone. As a result, management becomes numberscentric. The manager focuses only on the bottom line and becomes more
distanced from his employees. To him, all that matters is performance-the
means used do not maner, so long as the end result is higher stock prices.
What employee is going to give bad news about the quarter's profits or a
project's schedule ro a manager who is likely ro fire him as a result?''
Managers who are more likely to "shoot rhe messenger" are less likely robe
rold bad news that should be factored inro upper-level decisions in the corporation. Th.is also means that lower-level employees and managers are likely
to do whatever it rakes-even if it is illegal- to see that their jobs are not
Here Coffee (399) notes in agreemem thar "for the middle-level official rhe question is not whether rhc behavior is too risky to be in the interests of the corporation from
a cost/benefit standpoim. Ramer, it is: which risk is greater- the criminal conviction of
the company or his own dismissal for failure to meet targets ser by an unsympathetically
demanding senior management. Because the conviction of the corporation falls only ind irectly on me middle manager, ir can seldom exceed the penalry that dismissal or demotion means ro him." Here Langevoorr (114) agrees. "If the senior managemenr group
believes that it faces rhe threat of company insolvency, with the high probabiliry of
group firing, tihen it will see the tradeoff for not lying as one of the threatened loss
of salary, bonuses, and perquisites, plus any personal repurational dJmage resulting from
such a termination. That is a draconian rhreat indeed, and even a rarionaJ acror will be
tempted to avoid it through concealment, either to buy time ro creare the possibiliry of a
turnaround, or simply ro milk rheir posirions for as long as possible.... Legal deterrence
is minimal for selfish managers in light of the prevailing doctrinal regime's suong bias cowards vicarious: liability, wherein nearly all settlements and judgments are paid either by
the company itself or irs direcror and officer liabiliry insurer-not by the managers themselves." Ftmhermore, Cohen and Simpson (44) indicate that "resulrs show that rhe greater
the importance top management attached w rare of retmn criteria in evaluations of divisional performance, me grearer the incidence of both OSHA and EPA violations." (Nor
including this may be misleading.)
' Langevoort (121, 124) illusrrares rhis and stares: 'The highly siruarional incentive
to distorr [news] is exacerbated by rhe promotion and rerminarion srrucrures commonJv
found in large corporations.... To rhe exrent that any given employee fears the possibiiity to being fired or dead-ended in light of a candid portrayal of rhe situation, ... distortion or concealment becomes a dominant straregy regardless of long-term promises,
threars, or rcpLL£ational incenrives."
'
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lost over bad news. They will also exaggerate positive news, giving the highest level of management a very distorted view of reality. 18

C. THE INVISIBLE HAND

BOUND

OriginaJly, Adam Smith's idea of enlightened self-interest-the profitmaximizing rational agent- had greed as an essential pan. But while being
greedy, that self-interest was supposed to be balanced with a rational calculus that would lead to fair competition. Unfortunately, the factors that
entered inro the corporation's decision-making process have skewed selfinterest far beyond what Adan1 Smith envisioned. Greed has now gone bad
to such an extent rhar billions of dollars are lost through the decisions of
managers whose hands have been tied by corporate influences. Our goal in
the next section will be to see how the Invisible Hand can be unbound and
fair competition restored.

Ill.

MAKING GREED GOOD AGAIN

A. LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES

In order co present a proposal to fix the current problems with greed, we
must tlrst examine what has been tried in the past and why it has not
worked. Most proposals to prevent corporate crime attempt to influence the
rational calculus rhar is involved in corporate decision making by having
the negative impact of the results of corporate crime outweigh the profit
gained from it. Generally, society (and legislation) has tried to do rhis
through two different means. The first has been through legal sanctions. The
idea behind this is, by imposing penalties if laws are broken, to make it roo
expensive for the corporation to commit the crime. However, as the recent
corporate scandals have demonstrated, these sanctions seem to have been
woefuUy ineffective in preventing major corporate crime. Many believe current legislation to be roo soft on corporations. This view is held by many in
,. This follows from rhe very simple argumenr postulated by Langevoort (125).
"Posirive information will move more quickly to d1e rop, wirh the primary problem in
assessing it being che possibiliry of oversraremem, and excessive and confliccing claims of
credic. Negative informacion will travel more slowly, if ar all, and will be more subject £O
skewing. On average, a natural oprimistic bias resulrs."
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proves to be no contest. 16 This is how scandals such as Enron have
come about.
Looking at the situation from more of an ethical standpoint also illuminates another side effect of stock price maximization. Because rhe fear of
being fired for low stock prices is so srrong, managers tend to focus on rhar
aspect of management alone. As a result, management becomes numberscentric. The manager focuses only on the bottom line and becomes more
distanced from his employees. To him, all that matters is performance-the
means used do not matter, so long as the end result is higher stock prices.
What employee is going to give bad news about the quarter's profits or a
project's schedule to a manager who is likely to fire him as a result?''
Managers who are more likely to "shoot the messenger" are less likely ro be
told bad news char should be factored into upper-level decisions in the corporation. This also means that lower-level employees and managers are likely
co do whatever it takes- even if ir is illegal- to se~ chat their jobs are not
Here Coffee (399) notes in agreement that "for the middle-level official rhe question is nor whether the behavior is roo risky ro be in me inreresrs of the corporation from
a cosr/benefir standpoint. Rarhcr, ir is: which risk is grearer- rhe criminal convicrion of
the company or his own dismissal for failure ro meer rargets ser by an unsympatherically
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believes mat it faces rhe rhrear of company insolvency, wirh rhe high probability of
group firing, rhen ir will see rhe tradeoff for nor lying as one of the rhreatened loss
of salary, bonuses, and perquisires, plus any personal repmarional damage resulring from
such a rermina;rion. That is a draconian rhrear indeed, and even a rarional acror will be
rempred to avoid it through concealment, eirher ro buy tin1e ro creare the possibility of a
rurnaround, or simply to milk their posirions for as long as possible.... Legal deterrence
is minimal for selfish managers in lighr of rhe prevailing doctrinal regime's suong bias rowards vicarious liability, wherein nearly all serdcmenrs and judgmenrs are paid eirher by
the company irself or its director and officer liabiliry insurer-nor by the managers rhemselves." Furmermore, Cohen and Simpson (44) indicate mat "results show char the grearer
the imporrance top management arrached ro rare of renun criteria in evaluations of divisional performance, the greater rhe incidence of both OSHA and EPA violations." (Nor
including this may be misleading.)
,. L·mgevoorr ( 121. 124) illustrates rhis and stares: "The highly situational incenrive
ro disrorr [news] is exacerbared by the promotion and rerminarion srrucwres commonly
found in large corporarions.... To me extent d1at any given employee fears the possibility ro being fired or dead-ended in light of a candid portrayal of the siwarion, ... distorrion or concealment becomes a dominant strategy regardless of long-term promises,
rhrears, or repurational incenrives."
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Originally, Adam Smith's idea of enlightened self-interest-the profitmaximizing rational agent-had greed as an essential part. But while being
greedy, chat self-interest was supposed co be balanced with a rational calculus that would lead to fair competition. Unfortunately, rhe factors that
entered into the corporation's decision-making process have skewed selfinterest far beyond what Adan1 Smith envisioned. Greed has now gone bad
to such an extent that billions of dollars are lost through the decisions of
managers whose hands have been tied by corporate influences. Our goal in
rhe nexc section will be to see how the Invisible Hand can be unbound and
fair competition restored.
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Ill. MAKING
A. LEARNING

GREED GOOD AGAIN

FROM PAST MISTAKES

In order co present a proposal co fix the current problems with greed, we
must tlrsr examine what has been tried in the past and why it has not
worked. Most proposals to prevent corporate crime attempt to influence the
rational calculus that is involved in corporate decision making by having
the negative impact of the results of corporate crime outweigh the profit
gai.ned from it. Generally, society (and legislation) has tried to do chis
through two different means. The first has been through legal sanctions. The
idea behind this is, by imposing penalties if laws are broken, to make it too
expensive for the corporation to commit the crime. However, as the recent
corporate scandals have demonstrated, rhese sanctions seem to have been
woefully ineffective in preventing major corrporate crime. Many believe current legislation to be too soft on corporations. This view is held by many in
'" This follows from rhe very simple argument postulared by Langevoorr ( 125).
"Posirive information will move more quickly to d1e rop, wirh d1e primary problem in
assessing it being the possibility of overstatement, and excessive and conflicting claims of
credit. Negative informacion will travel more slowly, if at all, and will be more subjecr to
skewing. On average, a natural optimistic bias resulrs."
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Congress. As a result, Congress rushed to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act'9
in 2002 to tighten enforcement and increase sanctions as related to the
accotmting firms and other inruviduals who manage the books of corporations. Unfortunately, sanctions can go so high that they become ineffective
by being too overbearing. 20
Another technique that has been tried is market sanctions. The theory is
that if corporations fear damage to their reputation and loss of market share
as a result of crime, then they will not commit those crimes. This policy is
similar to what is oudined in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.
Unfortunately, most large corporations who commit crime will not suffer
enough in market share losses and reputation loss for this to make much of
a difference. Market sanctions appear to not have had enough effect in preventing corporate crime.2'
19
The Sarbanes- Oxley Act was designed co remedy many of t:he accounting regulacion shorrcomi11gs rhar contributed co the ability of Arrhur Anderson and other auditing
firms to "creatively bookkeep" and conrribme to the recent outbreak of corporate fraud.
~here are innumerable sources available char describe irs impact on the accounting profession and on corporations.
20 Ermann and Rabe (66) warn rhe legal commwlity against being overzealous in imposing sanctions. "Fines are not [generally] paid by the guilry parries. Organizational
agems responsible for rhc criminal behavior are nor harmed by an organizational fine ....
Furthermore, if judges try to order fines in che amounts proposed by economists, rhey
would confront what Coffee calls a 'deterrence trap.' Fines would have robe so large that
organizations would not have rhe resources ro pay them.... Repercussions for the criminal behavior would f.-ill upon guiltless third pai·ries.» La11gevoon (I14) also cautions
about harsh sanctions. "The narural response for the law would be to increase the sanctions, hoping to make the law salient enough to break rhrough d1e orga11izarion's rhick
cognitive defenses. As sancrions grow more draconian, however, we encounrer rhe familiar problem of overprecaurion.... The risks associated with the overlegalized corporarion
ar~ well noted in the literature.... It is hard ro predicr wherher any given high sanction
will rend to overdeter rather thaJl srrike rhe right balance" (170- 71).
21 David A. Skeel Jr., "ShaJTting in Corporare Law," University ofPennsylvmzia Law
Review 149, no. 6 (Jw1e 2001): 1817-18. Marker sanctions work from the theory that a
company cannot afford to be "shamed." As Skeel posrulates in rhis article, "an obvious
benefit of shaming sanctions is that rhey clearly signal a community's moral disapproval
of th~ offender's conducr." However, Skeel conrinues on ro point our rhe tlaw of using
shammg as t:he sole punishmenr-ir is possible rhar the compa11y (like gang members rrying to get a "badge of honor» by being arrested) may defiantly embrace the shame. In such
a case, or in cases where the rational calculus determines that the shame does not cost
more than is gained from illegal activity, then market sanctions become usdess bv t:hemselves. Prentice (202) also notes that "there are limits ro reputation."
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WHY DID T HEY fAIL?

The reason that these two types of sanctions have not had the desired
effect on corporate behavior is that they have all operated under an incomplete theory. Those policies have ignored the human factor mixed with the
corporate influence that is involved in the decision-making process.
Individuals make rational calculations differently than corporations, and
within rhe context of the corporate model they may be influenced to act differently than they would outside of it. Additionally, past models and solutions have focused on the amoral aspects of decision making, assuming that
morals have no place in profit maximizing. Past attempts at prevention have
not focused on reforming the system by fixing its causes but instead
have tried to punish offenders.
One of the issues involved in corporate crime prevention that has been
largely overlooked is the issue of crust. The twin concepts of trust- accepting o thers and relying on them- and rrusnvorthiness- doing what another
believes you will do- have been ignored for too long in corporate economic
theory and the laws that result from it. Studies of human behavior have
shown that trust is an essential factor in an individual's rational calculus. 2 ~
Furthermore, studies show chat employees who trust their management (and
by extension, managers who trust the corporation's owners, the stockholders) are more trusnvorrhy as well. However, lack of trust fosters an environment in which an individual is less likely to behave in a trustworthy manner
and more likely to commie a crime. 23
u Margarer M. Blair and Lynn A. Swur, "Trusc, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law,» University of Pemzs_ylvrwia Law Review I49, no. 6 (June
2001): 1735. Stout and Blair argue rhar "the behavioral phenomena of internalized trusr
and u usrworrhiness play importam roles in encouraging cooperation wid1in firms ....
[Experimental] evidence demonstrates that internalized trust is a common phenomenon,
that it is at least in part learned rather than innate, and t:hat different individuals vary in
their inclinations toward rrusr . . . , rhat decisions whet:her or nor to trust others are
in large parr determined by social context rather than external payoffs." Blair and Srour
0 740) later note rhat "the cenrralirv of rrust to business firms has been overlooked, however, by comractariaJl corporate scholars who emphasize market incentives, enforceable
contracts, and other external constraints on opportu nism wirhin firms."
n Blair and Stout ( I765) contend mongly for this point as an essential facror in corporate crime- and corporate honesty. They state rhar "trust in others is also closely
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Congress. As a result, Congress rushed to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act19
in 2002 ro tighten enforcement and increase sanctions as related to the
accounting firms and other individuals who manage the books of corporations. Unfortunately, sanctions can go so high char they become ineffective
by being too overbearing.~0
Another technique char has been tried is market sanctions. The theory is
that if corporations fear damage to their reputation and loss of marker share
as a result of crime, cl1en they will not commit those crimes. This policy is
similar to what is outlined in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.
UnfortLmately, most large corporations who commit crime will not suffer
enough in market share losses and reputation loss for this to make much of
a difference. Market sanctions appear to not have had enough effect in preventing corporate crime.l1
19 The Sarbanes- Oxley Acr was designed ro remedy many of the accounting regulation shorrcomings rhar conrribured ro rhe abiliry of Arthur Anderson and other auditing
firms ro "creatively bookkeep" and contribute ro the recent outbreak of corporare fraud.
There are innumerable sources available rhar describe its impact on the accounring profession and on corporations.
'" Ermann and Rabe (66) warn rhe legal communiry against being overzealous in imposing sanctions. "Fines are nor [generally] paid by rhe gu ilry parries. Organizarional
agents responsible for rhe criminal behavior are nor harmed by an organizational fine ....
Furthermore, if judges try tO order fines in the amounrs proposed by economists, rhey
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organizations would not have rhe resources ro pay them.... Repercussions for rhe criminal behavior would fall upon guilrless rhird pahies." Langevoorr (114) also cautions
abour harsh sanctions. "The narural response for rl1e law would be ro increase r.l1e sanctions, hoping to make the law salienr enough ro break rluough rhe organization's rhick
cogniri,,e defenses. As sanctions grow more draconian, however, we encounrer the familiar problem of overprecaurion .... T he risks associated wirh the ovcrlegalized corporation
are well noted in the literature.... It is hard ro predicr whether aJl)' given high sanction
will rend ro overdeter rather than strike d1e righr balance" (170- 71).
21
David A. Skeel Jr., "Shruning in Corporate Law," Universi~y of Pmn~ylvania Law
Review 149, no. 6 Qune 2001): 1817-18. Marker sanctions work from rhe d1eory thar a
company cannot afford to be "shamed." As Skeel postulates in rhis article, "an obvious
benefit of shaming sanctions is that they clearly signal a communiry's moral disapproval
of rhe otlender's conduct." However, Skeel continues on to poinr our rhe flaw of using
shanung as the sole punishment-it is possible rhar rhe com pany (like gang members rrying ro get a "badge of honor'' by being arrested) may defiantly embrace the shame. In such
a case, or in cases where tbe rational calculus determines thar the shame does nor cost
more rhan is gained from illegal activiry, rl1en ma,rket sanctions become usdess by themselves. Prenrice (202) also notes that "there are limits to reputation."
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B. WHY DID THEY FAIL?
The reason that these two types of sanctions have not had the desired
effect on corporate behavior is that they have all operated under an incomplete theory. Those policies have ignored the human factor mixed with the
corporate influence that is involved in the decision-making process.
Individuals make rational calculations differently than corporations, and
within the context of the corporate model they may be influenced co act differently man they would outside of it. Additionally, past models and solutions have focused on the amoral aspects of decision making, assuming that
morals have no place in profit maximizing. Past attempts at prevention have
not focused on reforming the system by fixing irs causes but instead
have tried to punish offenders.
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largely overlooked is the issue of trust. The twin concepts of tnist- accepting others and relying on them- and trustworthiness- doing what another
believes you will do- have been ignored for itOO long in corporate economic
theory and me laws that result from it. Studies of human behavior have
shown that trust is an essential factor in an individual's rational calculus.11
Furmermore, studies show that employees who trust meir management (and
by extension, managers who trust me corporation's owners, the stockholders) are more trustworcl1y as well. However, lack of trust fosters an environment in which an individual is less likely to behave in a trustwormy manner
and more likely to commie a crime. 23
u Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Swm, "Trust, Trustworthiness, and rhe Behavioral
Foundations of Corpo rate Law," University ofPenns_ylvania Law Review 149, no. 6 (June
200 1): 1735. Stout and Blair argue rhar "the behavioral phenomena of internalized trust
and rruscworrl1iuess play important roles in encoumging cooperation wirhin fi rms....
[E:xperimental ] evidence demonstrates rhar imernalized nusr is a common phenomenon,
that it is at least in parr learned rather than innate, and that different individuals vary in
their inclinations toward rrust ... , rhat decisions wherher or nor ro trust others are
in large part determined by social context rather than exTernal payoffs." Blair and Srour
0740) later nore rhat "rhe centrality of trust to business firms has been overlooked, however, by comractarian corporate scholars who emphasize market incentives, enforceable
contracts, and orher external constrainrs on opportunism within firms.»
' l Blair and Stout (1765) contend strongly for this point as an essenrial factor in corporate crime-and corporare honesry. T hey state rl1ar "rrust in orhers is also closely
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C. fiRST STEPS TOWARDS A SOLUTION
No proposal focused on just one elemenr of corporate crime can possibly hope co solve the problem completely. There are just too many diverse
elementS chat all combine ro cause corporate crime. However, by raking an
approach that acracks multiple causes, we can work cowards a solution thar
will be much more effective. 1n presenting chis solution, I propose three tiers
that muse be focused on in corporate law to prevent corporate crime in rhe
future and make businesses trustworthy again. T hose tiers are the shareholders, corporate culture, and employees.
i. Focus on the Source
The first focus should be on the shareholder. Shareholders in today's
marker are concerned only with how much money the stock makes in as
short an amount of time as possible. They generally do nor research a corporation thoroughly before investing, nor do they actively participate in irs
management even though they are technically owners of the firm. There are
several possible ways ro remedy this.
First, Mitchell presentS the idea of rax incentives ro encourage investors
to sray with one stock for a long period of time.z• The government can tax
stock sales when che purchase of the srock took place less chan a set rime previously, or it can give tax breaks for chose who have held a srock for a long
time. Giving incentives to stockholders to hold onto stocks longer would
prompt them to be more concerned about the future of the company as opposed to its quarterly yield. Additionally, tax incentives may encourage them
to consider themselves as part owners of a corpora cion rather than simply as
speculators gambling on how the stock will do over a cerrain period of rime.

correlared with trustworthiness. High uusrers nor only expect others ro cooperate; they
are also far more likely to cooperate themselves." Of course, in a corporate environment,
the converse also holds uuc.
" Here Mitchell ( 161) suggests the use of taxes co encourage investors ro invest for
the long run. He also stares ( 10) that "it's a simple lesson abour deferring gratification ... for~oing short-term pleasures for long-term benefits."
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A second solution is proposed by Lipton and Rosenblum.!S lr suggestS a
wav co free management from rhe shackles that annual stockl10lders'
ele~tions impose on them by going co a quinquennial election system. Under
chis system, members of rhe board of directors would be elected ro five-year
terms. They would chen have rhe chance to be reelected for another five
years based on their record over the past five years and their plans for the
next five years. This would have three positive effects. First, it would remove
the necessity for managers ro perform well constantly in the short-term
and allow them to concentrate more on the long-term. Second, it would
encourage investors to stay with the stock longer in the hopes that the
)ong-rerm benefits would be seen. Third, it would also encourage investors
and srockholders to educate themselves on the policies and decisions of the
corporation.
The idea of stockholder education is also a very important one. Under
rhe current system, managers can have a business plan that is extremely
derrimenral to the company in the long-run but chat produces incredible
'' Marrin Lipron and Steven A. Rosenblum, "A New System of Corporate

Go\'ernance,~ Univmity ofChirngo L11w Rrvirw 58 (1991 ): 189, 206, 210, 225. The

quinquennial proposal is one rhar is worth looking at. Lipron and Rosenblwn note that
"the legal rules, the system of corporate governance, should encourage the ordering of
these relationships and interests around the long-term operating success of the corporation.~ Under rhe current economic marker aunosphere "the relationship between managers and srockholdcrs is ... dominated alternately by apathy and confrontation.~ They
continue that "rhe corporate governa nce system must realign rhe interests of d1e corporation's srockholders, managers. and orhrr constituencies to promote the long-term health
of the business enterprise. Onl~· then wiU the pursuir of private interest again serve rhe
public interest as posited by classical economic theory." Because of the emphasis on shortterm profit, "institmional stockholders currently have lirrle opportunity or incemive to
rake an interest in the long-term business development of the corporations whose stock
they own .... The focus on the short term has come at the expense of rhe long-term planning, investment and business development of rhe corporation." Thus the proposal for
five-year elections. 'The essence of the quinquennia l proposal is ro convert every fifrh annual meeting of d1e stockholders inro a meaningful referendum on essential questions of
corporate strategy and control, and to limit severely the ability of stockholders to effect
changes in control berwecn qu inquennial meetings. Stockholders wou ld deer directors for
five-year rerrns. Directors seeking re-election would stand on rhe corporarion's record
for the past five years and its strategic plan for rhe next five years.~ The five-year term idea
is similar to the idea behind the Senate's six-year terms.
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profirs in the short-run-much like Enron. Investors who have not researched the company wiU be encouraged ro invest in it based solely on the
stock price of the corporation and how it has performed in recenr months.
However, a policy which requires investors to be informed of company
decisions, pokies, long-term goals, and long-term prospects~6 wiU have rwo
effects. First, it will result in smarter investors who will be less easily fooled
by short-term earnings reports. Second, it will require managers to have
good plans and goals in order to attract those educated investors who will
also be more likely to invest for the long term.
ii. Change the Culture
Focusing on the investor is only one means of attack on corporate crime.
The second m eans of attack is focusing on corporate culture. Proponents of
the structural model of corporate crime are correct in stating that many incidences of corporate crime are related to, and often caused by, a corporation's culture. 2" Changing that culture is as important as informing investors
or passing punitive legislation. This culrure change has ro take place from
the top down-starring with the board of directors and managers.
Culrure change muse start by promoting crust and trustworthiness.
T here is evidence that the level of trust at a workplace can strongly influence
employees' behavior and that an increase of trust and less by-the-numbers
management can have a positive effect on the levels of illegal activiry occurring in the corporarion.28 However, chis cannot be a simple facelift of corporate policies. Having all employees sign a Code of Ethics cannot have any

,. Mirchell (I 'i5) explains rhe reasoning behind the need for stockholder education
as the company begins ro focus on long-rerm goals. "The resuhs of ... good beha,·ior
won'r be apparenr ro stockholders in the shorr-rerm; in order ro make rhem understand
rhe business be nefits, rhey need ro be in ir for 1he long haul. In order for managers ro
behave ... responsibly, they have ro educate rheir srockholdcrs as ro the benefirs.. .. We
have ro work toward 1hat goal first by disseminating an understanding of rhese benetlrs in
business terms." Educalio n is one of rhe besr ways in which in vesrors will invest more
wisely and be willing 10 wair our shorHerm srock price drops.
! " See foornotes 16, 17, and 18.
" Blair and Srout (1738) argue "rhar rhe behavioral phenomena of internalized rrust
and trustworthiness play imporranr roles in discouraging opportunistic behavior among
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lasting effect in times of crisis unless there is a good faith change on the part
of managemenr. 2'' But if such a change is made, rhe effect will be that managers' rational calculations will be able ro be made without the negative
effects of chat lack of trust and adversarial influence that prevails in an environment that is not trust-centric. Information- both good and bad-will
flow more smoothly and without distortion. Efficiency will increase. Finally,
che culture will transform into a work environment where informed decisions are made and where trust inside the company leads ro trustworthy
choices.
iii. Facing Reality
Of course, we would be nai've if we were to ignore the fact that no matter how well we educate investors and reform the corpo rate culmre, there
will always be bad apples in the corporation. There will be those managers
and employees who try co cake advantage of the system for personal wealth
or other reasons. There muse be an additional solution provided for how to
deal with these individuals, as sanctions are the only way to prevent them
from committing crimes.
corporate parricipams.ft Citing evidence in support of this is Mitchell (226, 228, 230,
231 ). He states rhar when managers conveyed a sense of trust by the way in wh ich they
rreared their employees, "employees were almost five rimcs more likely to behave in a
tnL~rworrhy manner." Some suggcscions to create that enviro nment of trust include involving workers at higher levels of decision making, assuring workers rhar rhey are
sharing in productivity ga ins, reducing pay differenrial between managers and workers,
and letting workers know 1hat cri ticism of current practices won'r lose rhem their jobs.
MircheU says rhat the two most important aspects of trusr necessary in the corporate culture are "rrusr that you are doing your job, and rrusr thar your boss is rrearing you fairly."
As Blair and Srout ( 1738) insist, "The rime has come ro incorporate the reality of rrusr behavior inro the analysis of corporations and corporate law.ft Langevoorr (108) concludes
also thar "corporare culrural biases, particularly optimistic one~. can be adaptive mechanisms for encouraging rrusr and cooperacion. and for deflecting the selfishness-inducing
last-period problem rhat arises in rimes of stress and rhreat."
l" Mitchell (227- 28) warns that "in order to be genuinely trustworthy you have ro
internalize the value of trust. The fact thar rhcre may be payoiT for trustworthy beltavio1
is imporranr, bur if rhat's your only motivation, you will be inclined to break that t rusr ar
the margins.... {To build rrusr,] ... all you have ro do is care-and show it." He notes,
in a somewhar optimistic rone on page 51, that urhe simple facr is that most corporate
managers are good people who very much wanr ro be good .... And to look good, rhcy
have ro be good."
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Most legal sanctions are either too sofr or else run the risk of being too
overbearing. The reason that legal sanctions so ofren fail ro work in preventing corporate crime is that they are undercaken as the only seep of
prevention. However, when used with attempts to reform the corporate and
marker culrure, rhey can have a positive effect on corporate decisions. The
deciding factor is whether such sanctions affect the rational corporation's
goal- profit maximization-as well as at the rational individual's goaluriliry mrudmizarion-in a meaningful way.
If sanctions are pur in place only against the corporation itself, the effects
are rarely passed on to the management that is most likely the cause of the
criminal acts. In fact, che cost may be borne by rhe workers and investors
who have had no hand in the corporation's crimes.3<' This is due to the limired liability of corporations, which, while it has man y benefits, also presents
some problems because ir does not affect the rational individual's decision
calculus. Thus, we must punish the individuals who are responsible 31 for the
crimes. We musr also go afrer the corporations involved in the crimes. '~ By
doing so, we can affect the individual's choices and rhe corporation's choices
by making the cost higher than the benefits of illegal activity.
-'" Ermann and !\abe, 66.
-' 1 Philip I. Blumberg, "Accounrabiliry of Mulrinarional Corporations: The Barriers
Presemed by Concepts of the Corporate Judicial Entiry: Hastings lmmwtionn/ and
Comparative Law Review 24, no. l (Fall2000): 297. By "responsible," we mean rhose cases
with an individual's real imenr. Punishments need to rargcr those responsible for the decisions. Blumberg alludes ro this with rhe sraremem "there nevertheless remains another
promising, substantially unexplored, legal route to ach ieve increased accounrabiliry ...
through use of che judicial process. This is increased reliance on direct actions against the
senior American corpomte persom1el responsible for !be corporate activities in qu<!srion.
Such litigation can rest on rhe established principles of basic rorr law. It would prcsenr
none of the difficulties presenred by enriry concepts to rhe imposirion of vicarious liabiliry or to the problems presenred by che arrempred assertion of derivative jurisdiction over
foreign affiliates by reason of th e acriviries of a local affiliate. In brief, where an individual
commits a ron, he or she is personally liable."
J! Coffee (387) states thar "law enforcemenr officials cannor alford to ignore either
the individual or rhe firm in choosing their targers, bur can realize imporranr economies
of scale by simulraneously pursuing b01h." Deborah Lohse, "Executives No Longer
Getting Off rhe Hook," San )ost Mtrcury Ntws; (accessed 14 Seprember 2002): available
from hrrp://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/4076791.hrm. This is happening in
some courts in California, as rhe San jose Jllfercttry News repons. It is an imeresting fact
to note that such action does not need ro be taken by the legislature- rhe fran1ework ro
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Additionally, legislating punishments on corporations must be more
chan simply levying fines. Punishments for corporate crime should include
alternative sanctions that would affect a corporation more and obtain actual
recompense for rhe victims without making the corporation's innocent employees and investors suffer. There are a myriad of different ways in which
this can happen, such as equity fines, probation, publicity, community service, corrective advertising, civil suits, and criminal actions. 33 By going after
borh rhe corporation and the individual, we can place pressure on all aspects
of rhe decision-making process and not focus on just one part of ir.
IV

CONCLUSION

Corporate crime is a major problem in America today. Yet it is nor something that has appeared overnight. Today's corporate crime is a result of years
of poor economic assumptions, lack of con cern for the changing marker
srraregies, and impractical laws and regulations. If American businesses are
to be trusted again, it is time for a change.
This change cannot come on the basis of past economic theory. Our incomplete assumptions about rational economic behavior must be cast away,
and more complete models must rake their place. r:oremost among the
changes that need ro be made is the concept of trust and corporate culture
as they affect agents in the corporation. Additionally, the stock market and
shareholders' expectations must be taken into account.
Once we have looked at an economic rational actor model that closely
approaches reality, we must implement cha nges based on this new model.
Pasr preventative approaches to corporate crime have focused on one or two
aspects of the corporate decision-making process-such as sanctions-withour looking at rhe more fundamenta l changes that have to be made co have
a lasting effect. Such a narrow focus has proven unable to effectively prevent
corporate crime.
If we focus on different tiers of prevention, we will be able to create a
much more effective prevention srraregr that will have a chance to prevent
rrosecure individuals as well as corporations is already in place. Later CofTce (458) Sldtes,
Perhaps surprisingly. courts may be abl.: ro achieve (corpomre reforms) in subsmm ial
measure wirhout legislative acrion. ~ This approach shows much promise for future law
cnf<lrccmenr.
' Em1ann and Rabe, 66.
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Most legal sanctions are either roo soft or else nm the risk of being roo
overbearing. The reason that legal sanctions so often fail to work in preventing corporate crime is that they are undertaken as the only step of
prevention. However, when used with arrempts to reform the corporate and
market culture, they can have a positive effect on corporate decisions. The
deciding factor is whether such sanctions affect the rational corporation's
goal-profit maximization-as well as at rhe rational individual's goalutility maximization-in a meaningful way.
If sanctions are pur in place only against the corporation itself, the effects
are rarely passed on to the management that is most likely the cause of the
criminal acts. In fact, the cost may be borne by the workers and investors
who have had no hand in the corporation's crimes.30 This is due to the limited liability of corporations, which, while it has many benefits, also presents
some problems because it does not affect the rational individual's decision
calculus. Thus, we must punish the individuals who are responsible 31 for the
crimes. We must also go after rhe corporations involved in the crimesY By
doing so, we can affect the individual's choices and the corporation's choices
by making the cost higher than the benefhs of illegal activity.
>O
3

Ermano and Rabe, 66.

Philip I. Blumberg, "Accounrabiliry of Muhinarional Corporations: T he Barriers
Presemed by Conceprs of rhe Corporare Judicial Enrity," Hastings lmernational and
Comparative Law Review 24, no. 1 (Fal l 2000): 297. By "responsible," we mean those cases
wid1 an individual's real intenr. Punislm1enrs need ro rarget rhose responsible for rhe decisions. Blumberg alludes ro chis wirh rhe srarement "rhcre nevertheless remains anorher
promising, subsranrially unexplored, legal roure to achieve increased accountability ...
through use of the judicial process. This is increased reliance on direct acrions againsr rhe
senior American corporarc personnel responsible for rhe corporate activities in question.
Such lirigarion can rest on rhe established principles of basic rorr law. Ir would presenr
none of the d ifficulries presented by enrity conceprs ro the imposirion of vicarious liability or to d1e problems prcsenred by rhe artempted assertion of derivarive jurisdicrion over
foreign afftliares by reason of the acriviries of a local affiliare. In brief, where an individual
commirs a ron, he or she is personally liable."
2
' Coffee {387} stares rhar "law enforcemenr officials carmor afford ro ignore eirher
the individual or rhe firm in choosing their targets, bur can realize important economies
of scale by simulraneously pursuing borh." Oeboral1 Lohse, "Execurives No Longer
Gerring OtT the Hook," San jose Mermry News; (accessed 14 September 2002): available
from http://V1'Ww.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/4076791.htm. This is happening in
some courts in California, as rhe San jose Jvlermry News reporrs. It is an inreresring face
ro note thar s11ch action does nor need ro be taken by the legislarure--rhc framework ro
'
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Additionally, legislating punishments on corporations must be more
n simply levying fines. PunishmentS for corporate crime should include
lternative sanctions that would affect a corporation more and obtain actual
a
.
. , .
recompense for the victims without making the corp~rauons wno~enr e~nlo}'ees and investors suffer. T here are a myriad of dtfferenr ways tn whtch
pthis can happen, such as equity fines, probarion, pubt•JClt)',
. commumry
. serv33
ice, corrective advertising, civil suits, and criminal actions. By going after
both the corporation and the individual, we can place pressure on all aspects
of the decision-making process and not focus on just one part of it.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Corporate crime is a major problem in America today. Yet it is not something that has appeared overnight. Today's corporate crime is a re~ult of years
of poor economic assumptions, lack of co.ncern for th~ changt ~g market
strategies, and impractical laws and regulanons. If Amencan busmesses are
to be trusted again, it is time for a change.
This change cannot come on the basis of past economic theory. Our inmplete assumptions about rational economic behavior must be cast away,
and more complete models must tal<e their place. Foremost among the
changes that need to be made is the concept of trust and corporate culture
as they affect agents in the corporation. Additionally, the stock market and
shareholders' expectations must be taken into account.
Once we have looked at an economic rational actor model that closely
roaches reality, we must implement changes based on this new model.
Past preventative approaches to corporate crime have focused o~ one or ~vo
aspects of the corporate decision-making process- such as sanctJons-wtthour looking at the more fundamental changes that have to be made to have
a lasting effect. Such a narrow focus has proven unable to effectively prevent
corporate crime.
If we focus on different tiers of prevention, we will be able to create a
much more effective prevention strategy that will have a chance to prevent
prosecute individuals as well as corporations is already in place. Later Coffee (458) srares,
"Perhaps surprisinglv, courrs may be abl.: ro achieve [corporare refor~1s] in s~bsranrial
measure wirhour legislarive acrion.'' This approach shows much prom1se for ~urure law
cnforcemcnr.
33 Ermann and Rabe, 66.
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future corporate crime. We first need to focus on those who own stock. By
educating and encouraging stockholders to own stocks for longer periods of
time, we shif£ the prevailing attitude to where stocks represent investment,
nor gambling. By focusing attention on changing corporate cultures that
seem to encourage crime, we can make it less likely that an individual will
~eel the ~ressure. to commit a crime in such an environmenr. Further, by
mtroducmg the 1dea of trust back into corporate culture, we can stop corporate crime before it occurs. Finally, by prosecuting corporations and individuals with sanctions that will actually have an efFect, we can make the cost
of crime roo high for those chat would commit it in the face of stockholders' desires and a trust-centric corporate culture. Through chis mulririered
appro~ch we can wor~ tow~rds a more effective means of preventing corporate cnme and make 1t poss1ble for American businesses co regain the confidence of che investing public.

Lawyers: The Key to Instilling
Trust in Corporate America
Robert Snyder*

The possibilities offraud occur at the moment when an attorney needs to work
out the details ofan agreement while under n·emendous pressure from his or
her client . .. (to} work around laws to reach company goals.

T

he year is 200 1 and Americans feel betrayed. Major corporations have
swindled them our of their money. Investors watch in horror as these
public companies file for bankruptcy. The sh:~reholders know the chances
of their money being returned are slim. Many of the stockholders have put
their life savings into corporations such as Enron and WorldCom that are
now paying major settlements for fraud. Not only :~re these corporations
leaving the American people's portfolios empty, but they are also robbing
them of their trust. As a result, investments in the market plummet. T he
economy is in a state of turmoil. Everyone wanrs to know what caused
the corporate chaos. The finger naturally points to those occupations within the fraudulent companies that have been exposed.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FRAUD

Former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Harvey Pitt
points the finger at attorneys. He says, "One of the biggest dis:tppointments for
me since I came to the SEC has been observing the way lawyers are often involved in violations of securities laws. " 1 Pitt's statement appears to have weight,
• Roberr Snyder is a senior majoring in accounring and minoring in Spanish. He
plans tO graduate with honors. He will graduate in April 2006 and plans to attend law
school in fall2006.
1 Megan Barnett, "How to Account for Lawyers," U.S. News and V:lorld Report,
December 9, 2002, 26-28.

